

Topic 2. The being and the material (matter)

1. The philosophical analysis of the being category. Basic forms of the being.
2. The scientific-philosophical concept of the material (matter).
3. The movement, the space and the time as philosophical categories.

1. The being category is studied by ontology. As we know ontology is the philosophical doctrine of the being. This part of philosophy investigates the origin of the world, its universal links, the main characteristics and laws, as well as the main kinds of the being and other questions.

In ontology the world is interpreted with the help of categories – the utmost general concepts most of which interdependences with each other.

The most general concepts in ontology are the being and the no-being. The being includes everything that exists. The no-being means everything not existing.

There are some synonyms for both these concepts: for the being these are existence, world, Space, reality; for the no-being these are no-existence, nothing.

Everything that exists in the world has one common characteristic feature – **it is**, everything from the galaxies to the microbes and cultural phenomena though all things have different forms and ways of existing. It means the world diversity principle. So the particular

category “the being” allows uniting mentally different world things and phenomena on the basis of only one sign.

The being is philosophy category which helps to realise the universal link between everything existing: the nature, the social and the spiritual.

The questions which once appeared about the being and the origin of the world have always been topical but, of course they have their own history and those concepts which help to realise definite questions.

One of such concepts is “substance”. It signs the primary base, the origin, the real foundation of the world which is revealed in different forms of things and existing phenomena.

Depending on different number of substance we can define philosophical dualism and philosophical monism: dualism insists on the equality of both material and ideal origins, monism admits the priority of only one of them. So two main being kinds can be revealed: the material and the ideal. **The material** includes physical, natural world, the world of things, **the ideal** means the spiritual, consciousness world, the world of ideas.

If we consider substance as the ideal being that is the ideal monism (as Hegel’s philosophy system), if the material one – that is the material monism (as Marx’s philosophy).

However there are not only two being kinds. The world consists of the great number of different objects which can have some

similarities. On the basis of these similarities we can reveal the main being forms:

- 1) the being of things and processes;
- 2) the being of the human;
- 3) the spiritual (ideal) being;
- 4) the social being.

2. Generally the content of the material and the ideal being is specified in the categories of material and consciousness.

Material (matter) is the category which marks the primary base of the material being.

Consciousness is the category which marks the primary base of the ideal being.

The material is a very general and complete philosophical and scientific concept. It has such synonyms as the primary substance, the smallest part of reality, the inanimate substance.

Historically, the first definition of the material described it as the base of substance, of the bodily. Such understanding didn't oppose the material to consciousness. The soul was also understood as the sum total of the smallest material parts.

Following the Plato's doctrine about the ideal world in philosophy, material became the opposite to consciousness, spirit. Material was identified with the inanimate, dead, passive substance which was contrasted to the living, active one.

Early nature philosophers suggested water (Phales), air (Anaximenes), fire (Heraclites) to be the beginning of the world. Aristotle constituted material as the beginning of all the whole being.

In the Middle Ages the material became not substantial because it was made by God.

New Time made material not substantial but the sum total of the characteristics common for all things: extent, mobility, gravity and impenetrability. The physical observation, the possibility of fixing the characteristics had a particular meaning.

Later Kant considered that the world as the whole couldn't be the object of rational theoretical cognition. It became "the thing in itself". So gnoseology became the most important part of philosophy than ontology. Kant called to study not the nature but the cognitive activity of the subject. That's why the concept of material was removed from philosophy and it was changed into the concepts of space and time as more rich in content.

The natural-scientific and the philosophical concepts of material are closely connected with each other. If in classical physics material was identified with substance then the modern notion deal with the greatest discoveries of the 19th – 20th centuries in all areas of natural sciences.

On the boundary of the 19th – 20th centuries the discovery of the field as a new kind of material leads to the acute scientific and philosophic discussions, between materialism and idealism positions.

In modern philosophy the concept of material lost its characteristics and became the attributes bearer (first of all, space and time) without its own qualities.

According to the modern scientific world picture material is not-made, it's not-destroyed, it's infinite and independent of the man's consciousness. It nowhere and never loses the ability to change. Material can't only appear from nothing and disappear nowhere. It is the source and the reason of itself. This position is also close to the philosophical materialism.

Maybe our world also is not-made and not-destroyed? The answer depends on the philosopher's position which is necessarily based on the faith element.

3. As we know in modern philosophy material is understood as the bearer of its attributes – the space and the time. Space is characterised by the co-existing of the phenomena; time is characterised by their replacing.

So space is the material objects being form characterised by the extent and the volume.

The space is three-dimensional, homogeneous and isotropic (the same attributes on all the directions).

Time is the material objects being form characterised by the sequence and the duration.

The time is one-dimensional, homogeneous and irreversible.

The philosophic interpretation of the space and time categories means the decision of their objectivity problem: do the space and the time exist objectively; or are they only the objective ways of a human's world perception? Both these positions were formed in philosophy as the substantial and the relational space and time theories.

The substantial theory was defended by Democritus and Newton. They considered space and time to be the receptacles for things which didn't make any influence on the natural processes and which didn't depend on moving or resting material objects.

The relational theory was defended by Aristotle and Einstein. They considered that space and time were impossible without material; space and time were the specific forms of the material objects relations.

After the relativity theory modern science considers space and time as relative categories which depend on one more factor – movement.

Movement is the material's attribute which means ability of the material to change, to pass from one state to another.

The material can't exist without movement; therefore movement is called the way of material existence. The philosophical category of movement serves as the sign of the most fundamental material characteristics – to be and to reveal itself only in displacement, in interaction and change that allows the material to form objects and

processes; it also influences our senses organs.

First, Aristotle grounded the movement through the idea of eternal absolute motionless primary motive force (God).

Newton and Descartes considered God as the watchmaker-master who only started the world watches mechanism and didn't interfere in its further course. Hegel saw the source of movement in the internal contradiction of the phenomena.

Aristotle revealed six kinds of movement: the beginning, the destruction, the increase, the decrease, the transformation and the displacement.

Hegel defined three movement forms: mechanical, chemical and organic. Engels revealed mechanical, physical, chemical, biological and social movement forms.

In modern philosophy movement forms depend on the material organisation level. In modern science philosophy three basic material movement groups are accepted:

1) movement in inorganic nature (space displacements, movement of elementary particles and fields, atoms and molecules movement and displacement, heat processes, sound oscillations, geological material movement forms, Space systems changes).

2) movement in live nature (metabolism, reflection processes, self-regulation, control and reproduction, movement in eco-systems, etc.).

3) social material movement forms (all diversity of human

activity).

There is unity and mutual influence between all the movement forms. But the high forms are not reduced to the lower ones and differs from them. For all that each high movement form is included into each lower form as one of its genetic precondition.

In modern philosophy if movement is not linear and not closed, the movement idea becomes the complete systems self-movement idea.